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Abstract
Two different quantities have been suggested for quantification of evidence in cases
where a suspect is found by a search through a database of DNA profiles. The likelihood
ratio, typically motivated from a Bayesian setting, is preferred by most experts in the
field. The so-called np rule has been suggested through more frequentistic arguments and
has been suggested by i.e. American National Research Council and Stockmarr [1999].
The two quantities differ substantially and have lead to what is called the DNA database
search controversy. Although several authors have criticized the different approaches, a
full explanation of why these differences appear is still lacking.
In this paper we show that a quantity approximately equal to the np rule can be seen as
a P-value in a frequentistic hypothesis setting. We argue however that a more reasonable
procedure in this case is to use conditional testing, in which case a P-value directly related
to posterior probabilities and the likelihood ratio is obtained. This way of viewing the
problem bridge the gap between the Bayesian and frequentistic approaches. At the same
time it indicates that the np rule should not be used as a quantity of evidence.
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1 Introduction
A crime has been committed and a trace (i.e blood, semen saliva) is left on the crime scene,
from which a DNA profile is recorded. No suspects are pointed out, but a database containing
individuals with known DNA profiles is available. A search through this database is performed
and exactly one match is found. The individual with the match is put to trial. How should
one quantify the evidence?
In the case where a suspect has been pointed out by other means than the DNA profile,
the accepted way to report the evidence is through the likelihood ratio between the hypothesis
that the suspect is the source of the stain and its compliment. This ratio reduces to 1p where
p is the match probability of the given profile in the population of consideration [Balding and
Donnelly, 1995, Dawid and Mortera, 1996, Evett and Weir, 1998, Balding, 2005].
In the DNA database search case, two different suggestions have been made for quantifying
the evidence. On approach has been to report the likelihood ratio also in this case. Under
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simplified assumptions the likelihood ratio becomes (1 + n−1N−n)
1
p , where n is the size of the
database and N is the population size. The arguments for using the likelihood ratio have both
been its direct interpretation and its measure as the change of odds between hypotheses in a
Bayesian framework. The other approach has been to report 1np as the measure of evidence.
This approach has been named the np rule and has been suggested both by the American
National Research Council [NRC] and by Stockmarr [1999], though by different arguments.
The two approaches differ substantially. While the likelihood ratio strengthens the ev-
idence with increasing n (although only slightly when N >> n), the np rule decreases the
evidence dramatically with increasing n. Both camps have heavily criticized each others view
with no agreement being made. The discussion between these approaches now has somewhat
died out, with most scientists in the field preferring the likelihood ratio approach. Still, a
satisfactory explanation for the differences between these approaches and full understanding
with respect to some of the aspects in the criticisms that have appeared is lacking.
In this paper we will have another look on the database controversy by using frequentistic
tools such as type I errors and P-values. Looking at the probability for type I error, proper
account can be taken both for the multiple testing problem and data-dependent hypotheses,
aspects that were the main arguments for the criticism by [NRC] and Stockmarr [1999]. The
probability for type I error is in close relation to the np rule. We will however argue that a
more proper setting in this case is to use a conditional testing procedure, in which case the
probability for type I error corresponds to the Bayesian posterior probability. These results
both bridge the gap between the different views on the DNA database search controversy and
at the same time explains that the differences is rather related to conditioning than to other
methodological issues.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In section 2 we review the database controversy
and the main criticisms from both camps. In section 3 we consider the problem from a
frequentistic point of view and derive type I probabilities and P-values. In section 4 we
consider the conditional frequentistic approach while a summary and further comments are
given in section 5.
2 The controversy
In the following we will assume the match probability p and the population size N are known.
We will further assume that the DNA profiles are read without errors and that the DNA pro-
files of the individuals in the database are independent. All these assumptions are questionable
in real settings, but are made in order to simplify the discussion. In practice the extra un-
certainty introduced by the violation of these assumptions needs to be taken properly into
account, see Balding [2005].
In order to discuss the problem from a statistical viewpoint, consider the hypotheses
Hj : Individual j is contributor (2.1)
for j = 1, ...,N . The problem can be formulated as a quantification of evidence towards Hs
compared to the complement (that one of the other H ′js is true).
The likelihood ratio between hypotheses Hs and its complement Hcs for the database case
is [Balding and Donnelly, 1995, Dawid and Mortera, 1996]
LR = (1 + n−1N−n)
1
p . (2.2)
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For n = 1, LR reduces to 1p . When n increases, so does LR, though only slightly if N is large
compared to n. Defining odds in favour of Hs compared to its complement, we have
Posterior odds = Prior odds× LR.
From a Bayesian point of view this relation can be used as an argument that the evidence
towards Hs slightly increases when the size of the database n gets larger. This can also be
seen through the posterior probability of Hs which, assuming Pr(Hs) = 1N (a conservative
prior in this setting), is given by
Pr(Hs|y) = 11 + (N − n)p . (2.3)
(Dawid [2001] considered more general priors).
The National Research Council [NRC] argued that when searching through a database
of size n, there are n possibilities for match. The evidence should therefore be weakened by
a factor n, giving 1np as the weight of evidence. Donnelly and Friedman [1999] criticized the
NRC approach by arguing that they ask the wrong question and fail to recognize the full
import of evidence of identification based on a database search. Balding [2002] criticized the
value 1/np and argued that it is not reasonable that searching through a database should give
weaker evidence. The np rule does not take into account that only one match excludes n− 1
suspects and does not fit with the situation where n = N which gives certain identification!
He further commented on the issue on multiple testing, and claimed that this is not a problem
in this case because only one of the Hj’s can be true.
Stockmarr [1999] also criticized the use of LR given in (2.2), but from another point of
view. His main argument was that the hypothesis being considered, Hs, depends on data, in
which case the use of the likelihood ratio (2.2) directly is problematic. He therefore suggested
the use of an alternative hypothesis,
Hp : Contributor is in the database,
which do not depend on data but conditionally on the data, becomes equivalent to Hs. Using
similar assumptions as those behind (2.2), he then obtained a likelihood ratio of 1np for Hp
against Hcp. This he used for arguing that the evidence is weaker when searching a database.
The paper by Stockmarr resulted in several letters to the editor in Biometrics and also
other papers who all criticized his approach. One of the points made was that Hp/Hcp are not
the hypotheses of interest [Evett et al., 2000]. Dawid [2001] discussed this further making the
point that even though Hs and Hp are conditionally equivalent, they are not so before the
search and using the likelihood ratio for Hp/Hcp to evaluate Hs/Hcs does not make sense.
3 A frequentistic approach
Consider the problem from a frequentistic setting. In order to explain this approach, we will
consider this in a proper hypothesis testing with significance levels and P-values. We do not
claim that these are quantities that should be used in court, but will merely use them as tools
for explanation.
We want to test Hj, j = 1, ...,N as defined in (2.1). Consider a test-strategy where we
accept Hs and reject Hj, j #∈ s if a single match at s is found and the probability for making
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a wrong decision is smaller than a constant α. As for likelihood ratio calculations for the
Hp hypothesis, it is not possible to make the necessary calculations without further “prior”
assumptions about the hypotheses Hj. In particular, we will assume the probability for the
contributor being outside the database is (N−n)/N (this could be generalized to other priors
as in Dawid [2001]). We further follow Balding and Donnelly [1995] and Dawid and Mortera
[1996] in assuming independence of DNA profiles between individual in the database. Let D
be the set of individuals in the database. Then
Pr(Reject a true Hs)
=
∑
i
Pr(Hi)Pr(Reject Hi|Hi)
=
∑
i$∈D
Pr(Hi)Pr(one match for s ∈ D|Hi)
=np(1− p)n−1
∑
i$∈D
Pr(Hi).
where we have used that one match at s is impossible if Hi, i ∈ D, i #= s is true. A further
specification is not possible without making some “prior” assumptions on the hypotheses
Hi. Assuming the probability for the true hypothesis to be inside the database is n/N (a
conservative choice with respect to the suspect), we obtain
Pr(Reject a true Hs) =
N − n
N
np(1− p)n−1. (3.4)
We accept Hs and reject Hj, j #∈ s if this expression is lower than α. This give us a significance
level for the test (less or) equal to α. Using that P-values can be defined as the smallest
significance level for which rejection occur Goodman [2005], the P-value for the test coincide
with (3.4). For large N compared to n and p small, this expression becomes close to np,
indicating that at least in this setting the evidence towards Hs decrease with n. Note though
that for n = N , we obtain a P-value of zero as we should because we then are certain
about who is the contributor. One could also consider this through the Hp hypothesis. The
probability of a false conclusion then coincide with the expression given in (3.4).
Comparing now the Bayesian approach with the frequentistic one, we get (almost) the
same differences as between the Bayesian and the NRC/Stockmarr approaches. Now however
a fully frequentistic approach is taken. Why this difference? In the next section we will
demonstrate that agreement between the two approaches can be obtained by looking at the
frequentistic approach in a conditional setting. This will simultaneously explain the differences
described above.
4 A conditional frequentistic approach
Assume again a case is put to trial if one match is found in the database. The derivations on
the probability of a type I error in the previous section were based on
• cases put to trial (one match) and,
• cases not put to trial (zero or many matches).
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A low probability for a wrong decision could therefore be caused by a low probability for
actually putting the case to trial (i.e. cases where exactly one match is not obtained). A
more natural approach is to control the type I error within cases put to trial. Consider
therefore a test-strategy where we reject Hs if a single match is found at individual s and
the probability for making a wrong decision among those cases put to trial is lower than α.
Then, under the assumptions made in section 2,
Pr(one match) =
∑
i∈D
Pr(Hi)Pr(one match|Hi) +
∑
i$∈D
Pr(Hi)Pr(one match|Hi)
= nN (1− p)n−1 +
N − n
N
np(1− p)n−1.
Combined with (3.4), we obtain
Pr(Reject a true Hs|one match) = (N − n)p[1 + (N − n)p] , (4.5)
which (using similar arguments as in the previous section) is the P-value for this conditional
test. Note that in this case, for large N , the size of the database n is negligible and in fact
the evidence increases slightly with n. Note further that the P-value is equivalent to the
Bayesian posterior probability of H cs being true. An agreement between the frequentistic and
the Bayesian approach is therefore now achieved!
5 Summary and further comments
The main conclusion of this work was to demonstrate that the same value on quantity of
evidence can be obtained both from a frequentistic (using P-values) and a Bayesian (using
posterior probabilities) point of view.
All derivations are based on assuming that the match probability p and the population
size N are known and that the DNA profiles for the individuals are independent. Although
such assumptions are questionable, taking dependence into account would only complicate
the discussion and not change the main conclusion.
The derivations of the frequentistic P-values are actually not purely frequentistic in that
the calculations are based on assumptions about the “prior” probabilities for the hypotheses
Hj. This is of no concern to us since our main goal was just to show that the Bayesian
solution also can be seen as reasonable from a frequentistic point of view where the concerns
made by NRC and Stockmarr [1999] are properly taken into account.
An interesting observation is that by looking at P-values, the unconditional approach ac-
tually gives a smaller P-value than in the conditional case ((3.4) is always smaller than (4.5)).
This is in striking contrast to the conclusions both NRC and Stockmarr [1999] made from the
np rule.
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